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Migration is by far the most severe crisis facing 
Europe today. European Commission President 
Jean-Claude  Juncker  dedicated  half  his  2015  
 
 
 
State of the Union speech to the issue, stating 
that ‘the first priority today is and must be 
addressing the refugee crisis’. This crisis touches 
not only upon European security but also upon 
all the moral values upon which the EU is 
founded. The way in which this crisis is 
addressed will thus truly reveal how the EU lives 
up to its principles.  
Over 2,000 migrants have drowned during the 
seven first months of 2015 while trying to cross 
the Mediterranean to reach Europe. This makes 
this sea crossing the deadliest route for migrants 
in search of a better life.1 The number of 
migrants detected at the EU’s borders (mostly in 
Greece, Italy and Hungary) reached 340,000 in 
the 2015 January–July period. This represents an 
increase of 175% compared to the same period 
in 2014.2 And yet it does not take into account 
the people who crossed the border undetected. 
The number of asylum applications in the EU 
has increased by 45.2% in 2014 compared to the 
previous year, with more than 625,000 
applicants.3 And 2015 should definitively break 
this record. Furthermore, it is estimated that 
there are about half a million people waiting to 
attempt the perilous crossing of the 
Mediterranean from Libya.4 
Confronted by the current refugee crisis, 
most Member States are turning inwards. 
But migration will continue to rise in the 
future. Given that migration is an 
unstoppable trend, the EU has everything 
to win from turning this crisis into an 
opportunity for its own citizens and 
economy, for the refugees and migrants it 
hosts and for their countries of origin. The 
manner in which the EU addresses this 
challenge will truly prove if it can live up to 
its founding principles of human dignity, 
solidarity, freedom, democracy and 
equality. This policy brief summarises 
European measures taken in the last few 
months and proposes four key actions to 
create a well-framed European migration 
policy: effectively implementing the 
principle of solidarity and fair-sharing of 
responsibility between Member States; 
creating more legal entry and integration 
channels; addressing the root causes of 
migration; and broadcasting a constructive 
and positive narrative on migration. 
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These terrible tragedies, combined with what is 
considered to be the largest exodus since the 
Second World War, are prompting a reform of 
the European Migration Policy. But despite the 
efforts of the European Commission, the short-
term measures adopted by European 
governments in the last few months can be best 
described by a lack of solidarity and an absence 
of long-term vision for an issue that will become 
increasingly important. 
With war continuing to plague Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Somalia, and given Africa’s 
dismal human rights situation, all exacerbated by 
climate change that has caused drought in most 
of these regions, Europe is surrounded by 
people in despair who have no other choice than 
to flee in order to preserve their life, liberty and 
dignity. Although a certain number of illegal 
migrants travel purely in search of a better 
economic situation, the majority are genuine 
refugees. Can we still put ourselves in their 
shoes while asking ourselves: what would we 
have done if we were born in their home 
regions? Human dignity is at stake here. All too 
often fear takes precedence over compassion 
and solidarity. As the walls of ‘fortress Europe’ 
rise higher, the EU leaves its founding principles 
of human dignity, solidarity, freedom, 
democracy, equality and human rights at the 
door.  
There is no national solution to this crisis – only 
a common European approach can address it 
effectively. This paper proposes four main 
recommendations for how the EU can best 
address this crisis while remaining loyal to its 
founding principles. The first recommendation 
is the effective implementation of the principles 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
between Member States as enshrined in the 
Treaty. The second is providing more legal entry 
and integration channels for both economic 
migrants and refugees. The third requires more 
European assistance to address the external root 
causes of migration. The last, and probably the 
most important, as it is the basis of all the 
others, is to define and broadcast a positive 
narrative on migration. While the two first 
recommendations concern measures that can be 
taken in the relative short term, the other two 
are clearly longer-term issues. 
RECOMMENDATION 1: EFFECTIVELY 
IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SOLIDARITY AND FAIR SHARING OF 
RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN MEMBER 
STATES 
According to Article 80 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility between Member States shall 
govern the policies on border checks, asylum 
and immigration. This principle is the direct 
consequence of the Schengen Area that 
established the free movement of persons within 
the European space. Eliminating internal 
borders entails a reinforcement of the external 
border that must be backed by solidarity and a 
fair sharing of responsibility between Member 
States. A common approach is thus essential 
when one knows that a tiny hole in a safety net 
is sufficient to make it ineffective. The problem 
today is that the mission of controlling the 
external border has been mainly left to frontline 
Member States that no longer have the capacity 
to manage what is emerging as one of the 
greatest movements of people in history. As 
President Juncker rightly said, ‘There is not 
enough Europe in this Union. And there is not 
enough Union in this Union.’ 
Consequently, one of the first priorities is to 
reinforce the resources and mandate of Frontex. 
Despite the fact that it is the designated EU 
border agency, Frontex has in reality little power 
to operate. Under its current mandate, it is 
restricted to acting as a coordinating agency. In 
his speech on the 2015 State of the Union, 
President Juncker said, ‘We need to strengthen 
Frontex significantly and develop it into a fully 
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operational European border and coast guard 
system.’ Of course, the removal of national 
border controls between the Member States of 
the Schengen area should logically imply a shift 
of responsibility for external EU borders from 
national to EU level. However, even if this 
development is strongly recommended, it is very 
unlikely to take place in the short-term for 
political reasons. President Juncker nevertheless 
announced that the Commission will ‘propose 
ambitious steps towards a European Border and 
Coast Guard’ by the end of 2015. This proposal 
should take into account the following aspects, 
which are directly linked to the need for more 
solidarity and responsibility between Member 
States: 
- Frontex’s limited financial resources should 
be increased in order to cope with the 
current refugee crisis. The capacities and 
assets for the Frontex joint operations 
Triton and Poseidon have already been 
tripled to some €120 million for the rescue 
mission and the control of external borders 
in 2015–2016. But this is not enough. It has 
ultimately returned the level of funding to 
what was more or less spent on the Italian-
led Mare Nostrum operation alone. This 
mission ended in November 2014, to be 
replaced by a cheaper and more limited 
European operation called Triton. Where 
Mare Nostrum had a budget of €9 million 
per month, Triton and Poseidon now have a 
budget of €10 million per month.5 Yet the 
current migration crisis is much more serious 
than it was two years ago when Mare 
Nostrum was still ongoing. If Italy alone 
managed to pay this much per month, it 
should be possible for the EU as a whole to 
vastly increase the resources of Frontex joint 
operations.  
- For its rescue missions and its border 
control operations, Frontex has to count on 
border guards and heavy assets – such as 
vessels, planes and motor vehicles – from 
Member States. The problem is that, despite 
the emergency, Member States do not 
provide enough staff and equipment. Instead 
of begging Member States to borrow their 
resources, Frontex should possess its own 
equipment and employ its own border staff.  
- In order to ease the administrative burden 
placed on Italy and Greece, who have to 
handle most asylum applications, a hotspot 
approach coordinated by Frontex, the 
Commission, the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) and EUROPOL was agreed 
in June and implemented in September 2015. 
This approach consists in the establishment 
of a platform or hotspot in each of these 
countries, which will swiftly identify and 
register migrants and accelerate the return of 
illegal migrants. Over the long term, other 
hotspots should be established, starting in 
Hungary, in order to progressively transfer 
the responsibility of external borders to the 
EU.  
The EU has been trying to strengthen its 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) for 
years. But harmonising 28 different police and 
judicial systems is a complicated task. And even 
when common standards are adopted, it is 
almost as difficult to implement them in 
practice. The Dublin III Regulation, which is the 
central legislation of the CEAS, sets out rules to 
designate the EU country in charge of 
examining an asylum application. However, the 
system was not designed on the basis of the 
principle of solidarity and responsibility, and the 
current refugee crisis clearly shows its limits. 
The European Commission has thus already 
announced an evaluation of the Dublin 
Regulation in 2016.  
According to the Dublin system, the Member 
State where the asylum seeker first arrives in the 
European space is in charge of examining the 
asylum application, except in cases of family 
reunification. Once the asylum application is 
accepted, the refugee will have to reside in the 
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same Member State. It is only after two years 
that the long-term residence directive gives a 
refugee the right to take up residence in another 
Member State. In practice, this system has led to 
a chaotic situation where the countries situated 
at the EU’s external borders – particularly Italy, 
Greece, Malta and Hungary – are taking on 
most of the burden, while refugees have the 
obligation to reside in a country they have not 
chosen. As a result, frontline Member States 
simply do not want to handle asylum claims any 
more and tens of thousands migrants are now 
moving illegally within the EU to reach the 
country in which they have the greatest potential 
to integrate.  
Each Member State ends up turning inwards. 
While Hungary completed the construction of a 
four-meter-high iron curtain on its border with 
Serbia, the United Kingdom erected fences in 
Calais to prevent migrants from crossing the 
Channel, while France reintroduced border 
control with Italy, just as it did in the Franco-
Italian dispute of 2011. These increasing 
national measures could greatly jeopardise the 
Schengen Area, which is considered one of the 
greatest achievements of European integration. 
The current lack of control on the external 
borders brings about the reinstatement of 
internal borders within the Schengen Area. 
In order to organise solidarity measures in 
favour of Italy and Greece, the Council of 
Ministers of July 2015 agreed to exceptionally 
relocate 40,000 persons over two years from 
Italy and Greece to other Member States. 
Initially, the Commission had proposed a 
mechanism for allocating these 40,000 persons 
based on compulsory quotas for every Member 
State. These quotas would be established by the 
following criteria: the size of the population, 
national GDP, unemployment rate, the average 
number of spontaneous asylum applications 
received and the number of resettlement places 
already offered per one million inhabitants over 
the period 2010–2014. But Member States did 
not accept this. Instead, the allocation 
mechanism took place on a voluntary basis. As a 
result, Member States failed to meet the 
relocation target. Only 32,256 relocation places 
have been offered by Member States so far, 
despite a commitment to reach the target by 
December 2015. Hungary was exempted and the 
United Kingdom and Denmark used their opt-
out to avoid participating. 
In consideration of the extent of the crisis, 
heads of states agreed in September 2015 to an 
additional relocation of 120,000 persons from 
any Member States exposed to massive 
migratory flows. This time all Member States 
committed to participate. Although it is clear 
that a relocation mechanism on a voluntary basis 
does not work efficiently, Member States have 
again failed to commit to the mandatory 
relocation system proposed by the Commission. 
The relocation decision has thus been 
postponed till the next emergency meeting of 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 22 
September 2015. 
In place of all these emergency mechanisms, 
what is really needed is a recasting of the current 
Dublin System. In view of the planned 
evaluation of the system in 2016, here are some 
elements that should be taken into account. First 
of all, a common European agency responsible 
for all asylum applications should be established. 
Until now, recognition rates between Member 
States have differed widely: whereas Bulgaria 
accepted 91% of their asylum applications in the 
first quarter of 2015, Hungary only accepted 
10%.6 A common EU agency would provide the 
same procedure conditions for everyone, avoid 
the abandonment of frontline Member States 
treating the asylum claims and facilitate the 
allocation of refugees between the different 
Member States. A mandatory relocation system 
should then be implemented. The criteria to set 
the quotas between Member States proposed by 
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the Commission and described above to cope 
with the current refugee crisis are a good basis 
for this burden-sharing system. 
However, this proposal totally ignores asylum 
seekers’ preferences in transfer decisions. 
Furthermore, the Dublin System has shown that 
imposing asylum seekers on a Member State 
does not work. The risk of secondary movement 
would thus be very high if the asylum seeker is 
transferred to a Member State where he does 
not have any ties for successful integration. To 
reduce this risk, asylum seekers should have the 
possibility of choosing to a certain extent where 
they want to go. Consequently, each asylum 
application form should offer the opportunity to 
indicate up to five countries by order of 
preference. Each choice should be justified by 
particular reasons such as family reunification, 
community ties, language, professional skills and 
cultural connections. A regularly updated 
catalogue giving information on each Member 
State, including its labour market needs, should 
help the asylum seeker to make his/her choice. 
If the asylum seeker is accepted as a refugee in 
his/her first choice Member State, he will get a 
residence permit to settle in this country. If this 
Member State has already fulfilled its refugee 
quota, then the asylum seeker will have to be 
transferred to their secondary choice country. 
Eventually, the asylum seeker will have to be 
placed in one of their five Member States of 
preference. In accordance with the long-term 
residence directive, the refugee could still have 
the opportunity to move to their first choice 
Member State after two years. Such a system 
would insure solidarity between Member States, 
while taking into account the individual 
preferences of each asylum seeker. However, it 
would be very difficult to adopt politically 
among and within Member States.  
 
Another measure to cope with these unusual 
flows of migrants, particularly in Italy, Greece 
and Hungary, is the establishment of an EU list 
of safe countries of origin. Several Member 
States have already established their own list but 
a harmonised approach is needed in order to 
avoid one Member State becoming more 
attractive than others. This list should include 
countries that do not normally produce refugees, 
but do respect human rights and offer state 
protection. Citizens coming from a safe country 
of origin will still have the right to apply for 
asylum and their applications will be examined 
on an individual basis. However, their asylum 
procedures will be simplified and accelerated. 
This should leave more time to analyse the 
claims of migrants with a real need of 
protection, while facilitating the return of 
citizens from one of these safer countries. Such 
a measure is necessary in the current situation in 
order to distinguish quickly between those in 
need of real protection and those who are trying 
to enter the EU in search of better economic 
conditions. The Commission proposed a 
common list of safe countries of origin in 
September 2015. This list encompasses the five 
candidate countries for EU accession (Albania, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) and the two 
potential candidates (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo). Other countries may be added in 
the future.   
Finally, what is needed above all is a real 
commitment from Member States to take their 
responsibility vis à vis the surge of asylum-
seekers. Yet, since the beginning of this crisis we 
have witnessed increasingly selfish behaviour 
from Member States. Even countries like 
Sweden and Denmark, which for decades have 
been known for their openness and tolerance, 
are now changing their attitudes towards 
migrants and refugees, mainly under the 
influence of far-right anti-immigrant parties. 
This being said, Sweden remains the Member 
State that hosts by far the greatest number of 
asylum seekers, with 8,432 asylum applications 
per one million inhabitants received in 2014. 
Hungary, Austria and Malta come just after with 
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4,331, 3,299 and 3,174 asylum applications 
respectively per one million inhabitants in 2014.7 
But these figures are certainly not the result of 
their openness – on the contrary. It is their 
geographical positions that force asylum seekers 
to pass through their territories. Germany is 
often considered an example of responsibility 
and solidarity because it voluntarily accepts a 
large number of asylum seekers. In 2014, it 
received 2,511 asylum applications per one 
million inhabitants. In 2015, this figure is set to 
rise to some 10,000 asylum claims per one 
million inhabitants. Despite this great lesson of 
humanity, one must not forget that Germany is 
an affluent country that needs labour forces to 
guarantee its continuing growth. As regards the 
United Kingdom, there is a huge difference 
between its alleged ‘soft touch’ on migration and 
its actual practice. In 2014, it accepted only 497 
asylum applications per one million inhabitants. 
As for the Visegrad States (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), they are much 
clearer in their migration policy. In September 
the four countries published a communiqué in 
which they clearly rejected refugee quotas. Their 
objective is clear: keep migrants out of their 
countries.8 In 2014, Poland received only 211 
asylum applications per one million inhabitants, 
the Czech Republic 110 and Slovakia 61.9 
However, it is important to be aware of the 
hypocrisy imbuing national arguments. The 
different reactions of Member States towards 
asylum seekers not only derive from their degree 
of tolerance, openness and compassion, they are 
also the result of various national factors such as 
their capacity to integrate the latter, their need of 
labour forces or their general economic 
situation.  
This crisis represents an opportunity for political 
vision and courage to overcome the fear of 
losing voters. A CEAS based on the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
between Member States must be further 
developed, while providing more legal channels 
for both refugees and migrants, as outlined in 
the next recommendation.  
RECOMMENDATION 2: PROVIDING 
MORE LEGAL ENTRY AND 
INTEGRATION CHANNELS FOR 
BOTH ECONOMIC MIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES 
It is only through legal measures that the entry 
and integration of both migrants and refugees 
can be well-managed in the EU and its Member 
States. If they could benefit from coherent and 
effective legal channels, particularly for work, 
this could unleash the huge potential of 
migration for the EU, the migrants/refugees and 
their origin countries, creating a triple-win 
situation.  
For the EU and its Member States, the 
advantages are numerous. The European labour 
force is ageing and beginning to shrink. 
According to the European Commission, the 
EU will move from four working-age persons 
(aged 15–64 years) for every person aged over 
65 to about two working-age persons during the 
period 2013–2060.10 Working migrants, 
including asylum seekers, are young people who 
could ease the debts of national budgets and the 
pressure on national social security systems. 
Moreover, migrants and refugees are usually 
driven and hungry people with great potential 
for entrepreneurship and innovation. They also 
enrich our societies through their cultures and 
languages.11 Last but not least, the development 
of legal immigration should help reduce illegal 
migration pressure. Regarding the personal 
development of the migrant/refugee, working 
not only helps them to integrate, but also 
improves their standard of living, expands their 
skills and qualifications, and keeps them out of 
trouble. As for the countries of origin, they 
benefit from significant remittances equivalent 
to almost four times the official development 
aid,12 new investments, knowledge and 
technology transfers. 
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For economic migrants  
First of all, to improve the current situation for 
economic migrants, the EU should harmonise 
the conditions of entry and residence to exercise 
an economic activity. Although the Commission 
made a proposal concerning this in 2001, it has 
never been discussed by Member States. The 
latter prefer to keep their sovereignty over 
admission in order to compete with each other 
to attract certain categories of third-country 
workers. Therefore, whatever the existing 
common European migration rules might be, 
the national systems always prevail when 
deciding whether or not to allow the entry of 
migrants or issuance of a residence permit. 
Consequently, the European blue card system 
that set out various conditions for non-EU high-
skilled workers to work and live in the EU is 
rarely used. In 2013, 15,261 Blue Cards were 
distributed in the EU, with more than 90% in 
Germany.13 By refusing a common European 
approach that would greatly simplify procedures, 
Member States reduce the EU’s attractiveness to 
economic migrants versus other regions in the 
world. However, harmonising the conditions of 
entry and residence of economic migrants would 
not deprive Member States of their sovereignty 
over admission. They would still decide on 
applications. This is how the current system of 
short-term visas works. Although such a 
harmonisation is not impossible, it would 
nevertheless be complicated to adopt politically 
as most Member States want to keep their 
national appeal for migrants.  
The European Commission will propose a legal 
migration package at the beginning of 2016. 
This package will comprise a modernisation of 
the Blue Card Scheme, a platform for dialogue 
with social partners on economic migration, 
stronger action to link migration with 
development policy, prioritised funding for 
integration policies and cheaper, faster and safer 
remittance transfers.14 
This package could mark the opportunity to 
propose a common residence permit and a Blue 
Card valid in all Member States, increasing the 
incentive for workers to come to the EU. Until 
now, non-EU long-term residents (those staying 
in the EU for over five years) and Blue Card 
holders have needed a new resident permit/Blue 
Card each time they move into another Member 
State. If we want a single European labour 
market, free movement of persons should apply 
to everyone: EU citizens, non-EU long-term 
residents and Blue Card holders.15  
In terms of integration, migrants suffer from 
downward professional mobility, i.e., they find 
themselves in a lower professional condition 
than the one they had in their origin country. 
Support measures for links in our educational 
systems and facilitation of job accession and 
promotion are therefore needed. 
Finally, if we want migrants to become active 
social partners, we should foster their political 
representation. Many Member States including 
France, Germany, Poland and Italy still do not 
grant the right to vote to non-EU long-term 
residents. Even in Member States where long-
term residents have the right to vote, the 
representation of migrants in national public 
institutions is too often low.  
For asy lum seekers and re fugees  
In order to avoid the terrible and dangerous 
journey a refugee has to undertake to reach 
Europe, the European Council of June 
committed to a €50 million resettlement 
programme lasting two years to transfer 20,000 
refugees to Europe directly from their origin 
countries (Syria and Eritrea) or a transit country 
(Lebanon). Under the initial Commission 
proposal, the overall pledged resettlement places 
should have been distributed among EU 
Member States according to the same 
mandatory relocation system used in the 
emergency relocation scheme. But it has not 
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been accepted by Member States and the 
participation in the resettlement programme 
remains on a voluntary basis. Among the 20,000 
refugees, Germany and France take the most 
with respectively 10,500 and 6,752. Thanks to 
this programme, people in need of protection 
arrive safely by airplane and legally, with their 
refugee status established in advance. The 
immigration routes have become increasingly 
dangerous. The range of threats includes 
drowning, abandonment by corrupt smugglers 
and violent repressive measures by European 
border patrols. These European and national 
resettlement schemes should thus be enlarged. 
Member States should accept a minimum 
number of refugees on the basis of a mandatory 
relocation EU scheme that could be completed 
by additional national contributions. This would 
show solidarity towards those who suffer, before 
they arrive in Europe with the additional 
affliction of the journey. 
A second measure to allow asylum seekers to 
arrive safely in Europe is to lift visa 
requirements for asylum seekers coming from 
origin countries in clear need of international 
protection. By the end of 2015, the Commission 
will have concluded its review of which 
nationalities require visas.16 This could become 
an opportunity to lift visa requirements for 
Syria, Eritrea and Iraq and other countries in 
very clear need of international protection. This 
measure would at least greatly help asylum 
seekers in possession of a valid passport. 
In order to improve the integration of asylum 
seekers, access to work should be accelerated 
and better framed. According to the Directive 
2013/33/EU, which has applied since July 2015, 
asylum seekers should have access to the labour 
market no later than nine months after arrival.17 
However, in practice, access remains difficult. 
The main obstacles are language learning and 
the recognition of professional qualifications. 
Often language courses lead only to a basic 
knowledge. In France, for example, courses take 
refugees only to A2 level. Qualified asylum 
seekers have a second problem: they have 
difficulties in proving their qualifications and 
experience. This often leads to downward 
professional mobility.18 There are already some 
pilot projects in place to accelerate access to 
labour market. In Germany, for example, the 
programme ‘Early Intervention’ offers qualified 
migrants with high recognition rates an access to 
the labour market directly after asylum 
application.19 Sharing best practices between 
Member States should be a first step to 
improving integration. In the long term, we 
should also think about a new European agency 
harmonising national integration policies. 
Access to education, including higher education, 
should be improved. The same directive 
(2013/33/EU) states that access to education 
for minor refugees shall not be postponed for 
more than three months. Education should be 
provided in accommodation centres.20 However, 
even if it is difficult for teachers, it is preferable 
when education takes place in normal schools 
directly after arrival to favour integration as early 
as possible. A major problem is access to higher 
education. Universities have strict language and 
diploma requirements for entry. The Kiron 
University is a new, innovative project offering 
free higher education online to refugees and 
displaced people in Germany without language 
and diploma requirements at the time of 
enrolment.21 The EU should financially support 
such innovative projects in Member States.  
In conclusion, the current refugee crisis and the 
upcoming demographic crisis in Europe should 
urge our policymakers to adopt more efficient, 
fair and harmonised legal entry and integration 
measures for both migrants and refugees. Not 
acting would lead to suboptimal results and 
harmful effects, whereas a well-managed 
migration can become a win–win situation at all 
levels. 
  
 
   EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
9 
 
RECOMMENDATION 3: ADDRESSING 
THE ROOT CAUSES OF MIGRATION 
The measures adopted by the European Council 
in June and the Council of Interior Ministers in 
July and September are mostly short-term 
solutions. The first objective is to manage the 
crisis. It is nevertheless essential not to forget 
the root causes of migration, and to act on 
them. In the Conclusions of the European 
Council, development aid is not the most 
important point of cooperation with third 
countries. For the European heads of state, an 
effective return policy of illegal migrants is far 
more salient. The Council of Interior Ministers 
launched the operation EUNAVFOR Med to 
save lives by disrupting criminal networks of 
smugglers and traffickers. This operation will 
perhaps prevent some people crossing the 
Mediterranean, but certainly not solve their 
original problems. If we really want to prevent 
them coming to Europe we have to address the 
root causes of migration. This is a huge 
challenge. Many of the root causes of migration 
lie in global issues that the EU has been trying 
to address for many years.  
Wars, religious persecutions, interethnic tensions 
and political repression are the first push factors 
of migration. Scattered as the EU is, it is unable 
to deal with such external situations of chaos 
and can only endure the consequences. That is 
why the EU should reinforce its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and learn to speak 
with one voice on the global scene.  
Another important reason for migration is 
poverty. Development aid for education, access 
to health care, hunger and poverty eradication 
are absolutely essential. Together with its 
Member States, the EU is the largest donor 
worldwide, spending €58.2 billion on official 
development assistance in 2014.22 But on 
average, Member States fall far short of meeting 
the Millennium Development Goal. While they 
have committed themselves to support 
developing countries with 0.7% of their Gross 
National Income (GNI) annually, the European 
average for Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) was only 0.42% of GNI in 2014.23 
According to the UN, 0.7% of developed 
countries’ GNI can provide enough resources to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals, but 
developed countries must follow through on 
commitments and begin increasing ODA 
volumes today. The European Commission 
proposal to implement an Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa of about €1.8 billion is a first 
step in the right direction. This Trust Fund is 
designated for addressing the root causes of 
forced displacement and irregular migration by 
promoting economic and equal opportunities, 
security and development. 
Climate change is also becoming one of the 
main root causes of migration. For instance, 
three major food crises caused by drought have 
pushed more and more people from the Sahel 
zone to flee their homes.24 Consequently, Mali, 
Senegal and Eritrea were among the six most 
represented nations among people arriving in 
Italy in the first quarter of 2015.25 The impact of 
climate change is also one of the main reasons 
behind the war in Syria and the rise of the 
Islamic State, which have created millions of 
refugees today. Between 2006 and 2011, a severe 
drought created more than one million food-
insecure people, pulling them into cities. The 
government’s mismanagement of this food crisis 
was one of the factors that led to the current 
violent civil war.26 The consequences of climate 
change are thus very often interlinked with the 
two other causes of migration. The push for a 
strong global climate agreement by the end of 
2015 and reinforcement of cooperation on 
climate issues with developing countries has 
never been more urgent. 
Ultimately, the explanation of the increasing 
surge of migrants in the EU and in the world 
today is to be found in the current state of the 
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planet, which reflects the conscience of 
humanity. The root causes of migration are the 
syndromes of the impact of human actions on 
the world: war, pollution, globalisation, stress on 
natural resources, global warming, governance 
deficit and a rise in intolerance. These are huge 
challenges for humanity to address, requiring a 
profound change of individual behaviours and a 
new system of global governance based on an 
inter-civilisation dialogue. Avoiding short-term 
decisions, Europeans must have the courage to 
begin forging a comprehensive long-term vision.  
RECOMMENDATION 4: DEVELOPING 
AND SPEADING A CONSTRUCTIVE 
NARRATIVE ON MIGRATION 
According to a Eurobarometer special survey 
conducted by the European Commission in July 
2015, migration is currently the number one 
concern of European citizens, before economic 
issues and unemployment. This concern is 
mostly the result of fear of migrants, 
increasingly fed by populist parties. The creation 
of a positive narrative is thus essential to make 
this new reality acceptable to people. 
The rise of populist parties in the EU has 
resulted to a large extent from the recent surge 
of migrants in the EU. These parties propose a 
‘one size fits all’ concept: no legal or illegal 
migrants in our country. All the benefits of 
migration are swept out and replaced by a 
discourse based on fear. But fear is usually 
destructive. It is a mental construction and a 
contagious feeling that ends up making virtual 
problems real. By removing from their discourse 
all sense of compassion and humanity, they 
leave the door open to the worst barbarism, as 
history has proved. Of course, most of the 
dangers these parties envisage are real, but the 
amalgams and overstatements they make from 
them are much more dangerous.  
No, not all refugees are terrorists! It is clear, 
however, that security measures and the 
monitoring of jihadist groups need to be 
stepped up. But, with few exceptions, asylum 
seekers have IS, al-Qaeda and the Taliban as 
common enemies. And neither are all economic 
migrants job thieves. Although they might bring 
down local wages in some sectors, they are, 
above all, the labour force Europe needs to face 
its demographic crisis. Most of them are even 
‘exceptional people’, as characterised by 
migration specialist Ian Goldin. Unusually 
driven by all the dangers they have endured, 
they greatly contribute to the pool of 
entrepreneurs, innovators and risk-takers. Not 
all migrants are freeloaders wanting benefits for 
which they have not paid, either. Even if some 
might benefit from the national social systems, 
altogether they contribute positively to state 
finances and social security systems. In the 
future, they will be the ones paying our 
pensions. Nor will migrants completely change 
our European culture. Even if migration has 
positive and negative disruptive effects, it is 
most of all an unavoidable phenomenon as old 
as humanity itself. Who can pretend to be the 
pure descendent of the original inhabitants of 
their country? Throughout history, well-
managed migration has globally done nothing 
other than trigger growth and open ever-greater 
possibilities. Einstein, Freddie Mercury and 
Steve Jobs come all from migrant families!  
It is clear that Europe cannot take care of all the 
misery of the world. However, it is important to 
underline that so far refugees represent only 
0.11% of the total European population.27 When 
comparing the number of Syrian refugees in the 
EU and in Syria’s neighbouring countries, the 
difference is striking. Whereas the EU counts 
281,452 Syrian refugees with declared asylum28 
for more than 500 million inhabitants, Turkey 
has received more than 1.8 million Syrians 
among a domestic population of 78.5 million.29 
In Lebanon the situation is even worse: Syrian 
refugees alone represent 25% of the national 
population.30 It is, of course, important to 
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mention that the EU provides most of the 
recovery assistance to these countries with 
generous donations31 and that obviously the EU 
does not have the same proximity to Syria as 
Turkey or Lebanon. However, the disproportion 
of inflows is so big that one cannot help 
thinking that the EU is definitely not doing the 
most it can, and that money – despite its great 
utility – is not also the most convenient way to 
help.  
European and national politicians face the 
challenge of engaging in a well-balanced debate 
on migration and integration. It is essential to 
make people realise that, as explained in 
recommendation two, everybody gains from a 
well-managed migration: the EU as a whole, the 
migrant and the origin country. While not falling 
into easy populist discourses, politicians must 
also not dodge the challenges of living in a 
cosmopolitan and diverse society. This challenge 
implies integration, to which citizens can greatly 
contribute. Finally, politicians must not let the 
fear of losing voters guide their actions. This is 
what Angela Merkel did when standing before 
placards accusing her of being the ‘people’s 
traitor’, she said ‘There can be no tolerance for 
those who question the dignity of other people.’ 
The media also has a huge role to play by taking 
over intelligent narratives and facts to refute and 
challenge populists’ simple discourses. 
Journalists should be encouraged to visit 
accommodation centres, EU borders, transit and 
origin countries in order to report stories from 
asylum seekers, refugees, migrants but also coast 
guards, rescue staff and civil society groups and 
individuals directly confronted with the crisis. 
European resources should be deployed in order 
to help them to promote a constructive 
narrative.  
Politicians and their voters now have to make a 
choice. Every individual’s judgment on how to 
react to the migrants’ arrival in Europe is 
somehow an examination of their human 
conscience. In his State of the Union 2015 
speech, President Juncker said, ‘We can build 
walls, we can build fences. But imagine for a 
second it were you, your child in your arms, the 
world you knew torn apart around you. There is 
no price you would not pay, there is no wall you 
would not climb, no sea you would not sail, no 
border you would not cross if it is war or the 
barbarism of the so-called Islamic State that you 
are fleeing.’32  
Migration is here to stay and will continue to rise 
in the future. People should be aware that all 
solutions that reverse this situation are illusions. 
There is no middle way. The choice is between 
erecting walls and fences, constructing many 
detention centres, arranging mass deportations 
to origin countries and surrendering to the fear 
of the other, or finding a way of developing 
tolerance and openness while doing everything 
possible to ease the natural fears and 
apprehensions of EU citizens.33  
It is by being confronted with diversity and 
critical situations that individuals challenge their 
assumptions and learn who they are. The stakes 
of this refugee crisis are thus much higher than 
the practical aspects: Europe could lose its soul 
by failing to live up to its founding values and 
principles. As rightly said by President Juncker, 
‘These principles are inscribed in our laws and 
our Treaties but I am worried that they are 
increasingly absent from our hearts.’34 Member 
States, politicians and European citizens have to 
understand that a well-managed migration based 
on responsibility and solidarity is a great 
opportunity for all.  
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